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Abstract
In this paper, we study relativistic bit commitment, which uses timing and location constraints
to achieve information theoretic security. We consider the FQ multi-round bit commitment scheme
introduced by Lunghi et al. [LKB+15]. This protocol was shown secure against classical adversaries as
long as the number of rounds m is small compared to
√
Q where Q is the size of the used field in the
protocol [CCL15, FF16].
In this work, we study classical attacks on this scheme. We use classical strategies for the CHSHQ game
described in [BS15] to derive cheating strategies for this protocol. In particular, our cheating strategy
shows that if Q is an even power of any prime, then the protocol is not secure when the number of rounds
m is of the order of
√
Q. For those values of Q, this means that the upper bound of [CCL15, FF16] is
essentially optimal.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context
The goal of relativistic cryptography is to exploit the no superluminal signaling (NSS) principle in order to
perform various cryptographic tasks. NSS states that no information carrier can travel at a speed greater
than the speed of light. Note that NSS is closely related to the non-signaling principle that says that a
local action performed in a laboratory cannot have an immediate influence outside of the lab. NSS is more
precise since it gives an upper bound on the speed at which such an influence can propagate. Apart from
this physical principle, we want to ensure information-theoretic security meaning that the schemes proposed
cannot be attacked by any classical (or quantum) computers, even with infinite computing power. This is
in contrast with used schemes, which most often rely on computational assumptions such as the hardness of
factoring [RSA78].
The idea of using physical assumptions laws to ensure information theoretic security for cryptographic
schemes is not a new one. The most striking example in recent years is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
which allows two distant parties to distill a secret key with information-theoretic security [BB84]. The main
idea of QKD is to exchange quantum states on an insecure quantum channel and check a posteriori whether
they have been disturbed. If not, it means that no eavesdropper was tampering with the quantum channel
and the quantum states can be safely used to distill a secret. In fact, this works provided that the quantum
states are not too noisy. QKD is quite practical and has indeed been widely deployed, but at the same time,
it requires dedicated hardware and can only work today provided the 2 parties are not too far away from
each other, at most a few hundred kilometers (see for instance [KLH+15] for the current record).
The idea of using the NSS principle for cryptographic protocols originated in a pioneering work by Kent
in 1999 [Ken99] as a way to physically enforce a non communication constraint between the different agents
of one party (the idea of splitting up a party into several agents dates back to [BOGKW88], but without
an explicit implementation proposal). The original goal of Kent was to bypass the no-go theorems for
quantum bit-commitment [May97, LC97]. Interestingly, this original protocol was classical and allowed for
several rounds which increased the lifespan of the protocol. However, the protocol required to exchange
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messages whose length scaled exponentially in the number of rounds (i.e. the commitment time) and a
feasible implementation was not possible for a large number of rounds. A subsequent work [Ken05] improved
this scaling, but to our knowledge, no precise time/security tradeoff is available for this protocol.
More recently, quantum relativistic bit commitment protocols were developed where the parties exchange
quantum systems, with the hope that combining the no superluminal signaling principle with quantum theory
will lead to more secure (but less practical) protocols [Ken11, Ken12, KTHW13]. In particular, the protocol
[Ken12] was implemented in Ref. [LKB+13]. We note that the scope of relativistic cryptography is not limited
to bit commitment. For instance, there was recently some interest (sparked again by Kent) for position-
verification protocols [KMS11, LL11, Unr14] but contrary to the case of bit commitment, it was shown that
secure position-verification is impossible both in the classical and the quantum settings [CGMO09, BCF+14].
The original idea of [BOGKW88] was recently revisited by Crépeau et al. [CSST11] (see also [Sim07]).
Based on this work, Lunghi et al. devised a multi-round bit commitment protocol involving only four agents,
two for Alice and two for Bob [LKB+15]. They managed to prove that this protocol, which we call the
“FQ protocol” from now on, remains secure for several rounds, against classical attacks. Unfortunately, this
proof was rather inefficient since the complexity of the protocol (the size of the messages the agents need to
exchange at each round) scaled exponentially with the number of rounds. Recently, two papers improved
the security proof and showed that the complexity of the protocol in fact only scales logarithmically with
the number of rounds [CCL15, FF16], implying that the commitment time is essentially unlimited:
Theorem 1 ([CCL15, FF16]). The FQ relativistic m-round bit commitment protocol is ε-binding with ε =
O( m√
Q
) against classical adversaries, meaning that Alice’s cheating probability is at most 12 +O( m√Q ).
While the two proofs of this fact are very different, they rely to some extent on the analysis of CHSHQ,
a non-signaling game that generalizes the well-known CHSH game to the case where inputs and outputs are
not restricted to being bits, but rather belong to FQ the Galois Field of order Q.
Notice that in the way the cheating probability is defined, a perfectly secure protocol will have cheating
probability of 12 for both Alice and Bob. So an ε-secure (here ε-binding) protocol will have a cheating
probability of 12 + ε. The protocol has (stand-alone) security when ε is small.
The above result shows that the protocol is secure as long as m ≪ √Q but it was not known for larger
values of Q, in particular when m approaches, or even exceeds Ω(
√
Q). Very recently, this protocol has been
implemented by keeping the agents 7 km apart and demonstrated a sustain period of 24 hours [VMH+16].
Also, it is important to know that the number of bits sent at each round is log(Q) and therefore Q can be
efficiently made exponentially big in the security parameter.
Until now, no cheating strategy has been proposed for this scheme.
1.2 Contributions
Our main contribution is to present the first attack on the FQ protocol. We show the following
Theorem 2. There exists an attack on the m-round FQ protocol in which Alice’s cheating probability is
1− 1
2
((
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ))
)⌊m−1
3
⌋
where ω(CHSHQ) is the classical value of the CHSHQ game and m ≥ 3.
In [BS15], it was shown for any prime p and integer n that
ω(CHSHQ) =
{
Ω(
√
1
Q ) if Q = p
2n
O(Q− 12−ε0) if Q = p2n+1
where ε0 is a constant proven to be positive.
In particular, Theorem 2, combined with the above bound, shows that the upper bound of [CCL15, FF16]
(Theorem 1) is essentially optimal when considering an even prime power :
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Corollary 1. For any integer n, prime number p and Q = p2n there is a cheating strategy for Alice that
achieves success probability
1− 1
2
(
1− Ω( 1√
Q
)
)⌊m−1
3
⌋
.
• If m≪ √Q then the above cheating probability is equal to 12 +Ω( m√Q )− o( m√Q ).
• If m = t√Q then the above cheating probability is lower bounded by 1− 12e−
t
3 , which quickly approaches
1 as t increases.
From the above bounds, we can conclude that up to constant factors, our attack is optimal when Q is an
even power of a prime.
We note also that there is an upper bound on the value of CHSHQ when Q is an odd power of a prime.
In this case, we have ω(CHSHQ) = Ω(Q
−2/3) [BS15, PP16]. From there, we have
Corollary 2. For any integer n, prime number p and Q = p2n+1 there is a cheating strategy for Alice that
achieves success probability
1− 1
2
(
1− Ω(Q−2/3)
)⌊m−1
3
⌋
.
and ifm = tQ
2
3 then Alice can cheat with probability 1− 12e−
t
3 which quickly converges to 1 as t increases.
This result also shows that even an improved bound on ω(CHSHQ) variants presented in [PPP16] cannot
be used to improve - except in the constants - the security of the FQ protocol, at least for even prime powers
of Q.
Our second contribution is an extension of this attack to more realistic scenarios from the attacker’s point
of view. In the relativistic model, we assume that cheating Alice can perform communications between A1
and A2 such that both agents of Alice know exactly the whole transcript of the protocol, except the last
round message sent to the other Alice. Proving security in this setting allows us to minimize the spacetime
requirements in order to achieve security.
However, our attack also assumes this power for cheating Alice and this could be very challenging in
practice. Therefore, we introduce the notion of propagation time which corresponds to the number of rounds
ρ that can pass until the Alices are able to send some information to one another. In the original model,
this propagation time is 2 rounds. We perform extend Theorem 2 to the following setting
• The propagation time ρ can be larger than 2.
• The two Alices know the bit they want to reveal only after k0 ≥ 1 rounds. We call k0 the decision
time.
Showing that the attack works in this setting ensures that simple countermeasures consisting of increasing
the distance between the two pairs will not significantly reduce the efficiency of the attack. We show the
following:
Theorem 3. For any propagation time ρ ≥ 2, and any decision time k0, there exists an attack on the
m-round FQ protocol where Alice’s cheating probability is
1− 1
2
(
(1− 1
Q
) (1− ω(CHSHQ))
)⌊m−k0−1
ρ+1
⌋
.
for m ≥ k0 + 2.
Organisation — In Section 2, we present the FQ protocol as well as the CHSHQ game. In Section 3, we
present our main result, namely the attack on the FQ protocol. Finally, in Section 4, we present the extension
of this attack to more realistic scenarios.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bit commitment
Bit commitment is a cryptographic primitive between two distrustful parties Alice and Bob which consists
of 2 phases: a Commit phase and a Reveal phase. Alice has a random bit d at the beginning of the protocol.
In the commit phase, Alice will commit to this value d by performing some communication protocol such
that at end of the commit phase, Bob knows no information about d. In the second phase, the reveal phase,
Alice and Bob also perform some communication which results in Alice revealing d. A desired property here
is that Alice is unable to reveal a bit different from the one chosen during the commit phase.
In some sense, a bit commitment protocol simulates a digital safe. In the commit phase, Alice writes
her input d on a piece of paper, puts that paper into the safe and sends the safe to Bob. If Bob has no
information about the key safe then he cannot open it and therefore has no information about d. In the
reveal phase, Alice would send to Bob the key to open the safe. But she cannot change the value of the
bit in the safe because Bob has control of the safe. This primitive has been widely studied. However, bit
commitment can only be performed with computational security in most usual models.
We now give a formal definition of the bit commitment scheme.
Definition 1. A bit commitment scheme is an interactive protocol between Alice and Bob with two phases,
a Commit phase and a Reveal phase.
• Commit phase. Alice chooses a uniformly random input d that she wants to commit to. To do so, Alice
and Bob perform a communication protocol that corresponds to this commit phase.
• Reveal phase. Alice interacts with Bob in order to reveal d. To do so, they perform a second commu-
nication protocol where at the end, Bob should know the value revealed by Alice. Bob, depending on
this revealed value and the interaction with Alice, outputs “Accept" or “Reject".
We also define the following security requirements for the commitment scheme.
Definition 2. A bit commitment protocol is said to be correct if when both players are honest, Bob never
outputs “Reject".
A cheating strategy S for Alice can be therefore decomposed into a cheating strategy Scommit for the
commit phase and Sreveal for the reveal phase and we will usually write S = (Scommit, Sreveal). The goal of
a cheating Alice is to choose the value she wants to reveal only after the commit phase. The reveal strategy
Sreveal will depend on the value d she wants to reveal. We denote by Sreveal(d) Alice’s cheating strategy in
the reveal phase for a fixed d.
Definition 3. For a fixed cheating strategy S = (SCommit, Sreveal) for Alice, we define Alice’s cheating
probability P ∗A(S) as
P ∗A(S) :=
1
2
Pr[ Alice successfully reveals d = 0|(SCommit, Sreveal(0))]+
1
2
Pr[ Alice successfully reveals d = 1|(SCommit, Sreveal(1))].
Definition 4. We define Alice’s optimal cheating probability P ∗A as
P ∗A := max
S=(SCommit,Sreveal)
P ∗A(S).
We say that a bit commitment is ε sum-binding if P ∗A ≤ 12 + ε.
Here, we used one of several possible definitions for the binding property. This definition is weak, since
it doesn’t necessarily behave well under composition. In order to prove security, even for relativistic bit
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commitment protocols, some stronger definitions of security are used (see for example [FF16]). While using
a stronger security definitions strengthens upper bounds on the cheating probability, it is by using the weakest
security definition that we have the strongest lower bounds on those cheating probabilities. Since in this
paper, we present cheating strategies, i .e. lower bounds, we use the weak notion of sum-binding.
Another security condition we want to ensure is the hiding property. At the end of the commit phase,
we don’t want Bob to have a lot of information about the committed bit d. This means that to ensure the
hiding property, we will only be interested in a cheating Bob’s strategy during the commit phase, and a
cheating strategy SB for Bob will be a strategy that he will use to try to learn d after the commit phase.
Definition 5. For a fixed cheating strategy SB for Bob, we define his cheating probability P ∗B(S
B) as
P ∗B(S
B) := Pr[Bob guesses d after the Commit phase|SB].
Definition 6. We define Bob’s optimal cheating probability P ∗B as
P ∗B := max
SB
P ∗B(S
B).
We say that a bit commitment is ε-hiding is P ∗B ≤ 12 + ε.
2.2 Relativistic bit commitment
A relativistic bit commitment scheme is a commitment scheme where we use physical property that no
information carrier can travel faster than the speed of light. In order to take advantage of this principle, we
split Alice (resp. Bob) into 2 agents A1 and A2 (respectively B1 and B2). For each i ∈ {1, 2}, Alicei interacts
only with Bobi. If we put the two pairs (A1,B1) and (A2,B2) far apart, and use some timing constraints, we
can create some non-signaling type scenarios. Here, we will only use the property that the two honest Bobs
know their respective location. In particular, there is no trust needed regarding the location of the cheating
parties.
The security definitions for relativistic bit commitment are the ones we presented in the above Section.
We will now describe the FQ relativistic bit commitment scheme. This description will consist of 4 phases,
the preparation phase, the commit phase, the sustain phase and the reveal phase. The preparation phase is
some preprocessing phase that can be done anytime before the protocol. The sustain phase can be seen as
a part of the reveal phase, and corresponds to the time where the committed bit is safe. We assume here
that the two Alices know at the beginning of the sustain phase the bit d they want to reveal. In Section 4,
we will relax this requirement.
The single-round FQ protocol. — The single-round version corresponds to the protocol introduced
by Crépeau et al. [CSST11] (see also [Sim07]). Both players, Alice and Bob, have agents A1,A2 and B1,B2
present at two spatial locations, 1 and 2, separated by a distance D. We consider the case where Alice makes
the commitment. The protocol (followed by honest players) consists of 4 phases : preparation, commit,
sustain and reveal. The sustain phase in the single-round protocol is trivial and simply consists in waiting
for a time less than D/c, which is the time needed for light to travel between the two locations. The bit
commitment protocol goes as follows.
1. Preparation phase: A1,A2 (resp. B1,B2) share a random number a ∈ FQ (resp. x ∈ FQ).
2. Commit phase: B1 sends x to A1, who returns y = a+ d · x where d ∈ {0, 1} is the committed bit.
3. Sustain phase: A1 and A2 wait for some time τ < D/c.
4. Reveal phase: A2 reveals the values of d and a to B2 who checks that y = a+ d · x.
The multi-round protocol.— The protocol above was recently extended to a multi-round commitment
scheme [LKB+15]. The main idea to increase the commitment time is to delay the reveal phase and have
A2 commit to the string a instead of revealing it. In fact, the new sustain phase will now consist of many
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rounds where the active players (i.e. the player to commits in that given round and the corresponding player
for Bob) alternate between locations 1 and 2, separated by a distance D. The m-round bit commitment
protocol goes as follows
1. Preparation phase: A1,A2 (resp. B1,B2) share m random numbers a1, . . . , am (resp. x1, . . . , xm) ∈ FQ.
2. Commit phase: B1 sends x1 to A1, who returns y1 = d ·x1 + a1, where d ∈ {0, 1} is the committed bit.
3. Sustain phase: for each round k, with 2 ≤ k < m, Bk mod 2 sends xk to Ak mod 2, who returns
yk = xk · ak−1 + ak.
4. Reveal phase: A1 reveals d and ym = am−1 to B1. Bob checks that ym = αm−1, where we recursively
define α0 := d, αi := yi − bi ∗ αi−1. αi corresponds to what ai “should be”.
The main idea of the multi-round protocol is to delay the reveal phase in order to increase the commitment
time. This delay is obtained by making the passive Alice commit to the value of the string she was supposed
to reveal in the previous round. Since each round increases the total commitment time by D/c, modulo
the time needed for the various algebraic manipulations in FQ, one sees that the required number of rounds
scales linearly with the commitment time one wishes to achieve.
We require that round j finishes before any information about xj−1 reaches the other Alice. For any j, we
therefore have the following : active Alice has no information about xj−1. This means that yj is independent
of xj−1. This will be crucial in order to show security of the protocol. One important thing to notice is that
d, the bit Alice wants to reveal can be decided just after the commit phase. Therefore, y1 is independent of
d but all the other messages y2, . . . , ym can depend on d.
Both those protocol are perfectly hiding. Moreover, from Theorem 1, the multi-round protocol is ε
sum-binding, with ε = O( m√
Q
).
2.3 The CHSHQ game
A crucial tool for our attack (and for the previous security analysis), is the CHSHQ two-player game intro-
duced by Buhrman and Massar [BM05]. This game is a natural generalization of the CHSH game to the
field FQ, where two cooperating but non-communicating parties, Alice and Bob, are respectively given an
input x and y chosen uniformly at random from FQ, and must output two numbers a, b ∈ FQ. They win the
game whenever the condition a+ b = x · y is satisfied. The value of a game G, denoted ω(G), corresponds
to the maximum probability of winning the game. A recent result by Bravarian and Shor [BS15] establishes
bounds on ω(CHSHQ). They show the following
Proposition 1. for any prime p and integer n, we have
ω(CHSHQ) =
{
Ω(
√
1
Q ) if Q = p
2n
O(Q− 12−ε0) if Q = p2n+1
for some absolute constant ε0 > 0.
We define a variant of the CHSHQ game, that we call CHSH
γ
Q, which will be well defined for any γ ∈ [0, 1].
We will use this variant in Section 4, when we will have longer propagation and decision times.
Definition 7. In CHSHγQ, Alice receives x = 0 with probability γ and a random element x ∈ F∗Q, each
with probability 1−γQ−1 . Bob receives an input y according to the same probability distribution. They output
respectively a and b in FQ and they win the game iff. a+ b = x · y.
In short, CHSHγQ is the same game as CHSHQ, but the input distribution of each player is slightly biased
towards 0. We have by definition CHSH
1
Q
Q = CHSHQ. When playing CHSH
γ
Q, we have:
• The probability that Alice and Bob get (0, 0) is γ2.
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• The probability that they get an element (0, i) or (i, 0) with i ∈ F∗Q is equal to γ(1−γ)Q−1 for each such
element.
• The probability that they get an element (i, j) with i, j ∈ F∗Q is equal to (1−γ)
2
(Q−1)2 for each such element.
Inspired by shift techniques used in [BS15], we can show:
Lemma 1. For any γ ∈ [0, 1], ω(CHSHγQ) ≥ ω(CHSHQ).
Proof. As randomized strategies are nothing more than linear combinations of deterministic strategies, of
which winning probability is given by the same linear combination, we can assume that all used optimal
strategies are deterministic without loss of generality.
We consider an optimal strategy S = (s1, s2) for the CHSH game i.e. function s1, s2 : FQ → FQ such that
Prx,y[s1(x) + s2(y) = xy] = ω(CHSHQ), where the probability is over uniform x and y. We define px,y := 1
if s1(x) + s2(y) = xy and 0 otherwise, which implies Exypxy = ω(CHSHQ). Let
Zu,v := γ
2pu,v +
γ(1− γ)
Q− 1

 ∑
x∈FQ−{u}
pxv +
∑
y∈FQ−{v}
puy

+ (1− γ)2
(Q− 1)2
∑
x∈FQ−{u}
y∈FQ−{v}
pxy.
Zu,v corresponds to the probability of winning the game CHSHQ on a changed probability distribution.
In particular, Z0,0 corresponds to the probability of winning CHSH
γ
Q when using strategy S. One can check
that Eu,v[Zu,v] = ω(CHSHQ), so we can fix a pair (u, v) such that Zu,v ≥ ω(CHSHQ).
We now consider the strategy S′ = (s′1, s
′
2) where s
′
1(x) = s1(x+u)−xw and s′2(y) = s2(y+v)−yu−uv.
S′ wins for (x, y) precisely when S wins for (x+ u, y + v). Indeed :
s′1(x) + s
′
2(y) = xy ⇔ s1(x+ u)− xv + s2(y + u)− yu− uv = xy
⇔ s1(x+ u) + s2(y + v) = (x + u)(y + v)
Similarly, as before, we define p′xy = 1 if s
′
1(x)+s
′
2(y) = x·y and 0 otherwise. From the above equivalence,
we have p′x,y = p(x+u),(y+v). We also define
Z ′u,v := γ
2p′u,v +
γ(1− γ)
Q− 1

 ∑
x∈FQ−{u}
p′xv +
∑
y∈FQ−{v}
p′uy

+ (1− γ)2
(Q− 1)2
∑
x∈FQ−{u}
y∈FQ−{v}
p′xy.
Notice that Z ′0,0 corresponds to the probability of winning CHSH
γ
Q when using strategy S
′. Moreover, for
any (x, y), we have Z ′x,y = Zx+u,y+v. From there, we conclude
ω(CHSHγQ) ≥ Z ′0,0 = Zu,v ≥ ω(CHSHQ),
which proves the desired result.
3 Attack with perfect conditions
In this Section, we present our construction of a cheating strategy which will be essentially optimal for some
values of Q. The protocol is perfectly hiding. Therefore, we are only interested in the binding property, i.e.
in cheating Alice.
The idea of the attack is the following. Every three rounds (or more in Section 4), Alice’s agents have an
occasion to play a CHSHQ game. If they win this game, which happens with probability ω(CHSHQ), they
can easily fool Bob (with the provided strategy, sending only zeros until reveal phase is fine). If they do not
manage to win the CHSHQ game, they just try again three rounds later. More precisely, for each step of
three rounds, the last two rounds are used to play the CHSHQ game. The first one allows A1 and A2 to
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determine if they won during the previous step, or calculate a corrective factor η if they did not. Thus, for
a m-round long protocol, Alice’s agent can play roughly m3 such CHSHQ games. As it is sufficient for them
to win one of these games, we see that cheating probability grows exponentially with the number of rounds.
Moreover, at each of these sets of three rounds, an additional factor (1− 1Q ) appears. Indeed, if at the third
round of the set Bob sends a 0, Alice is also in a situation in which she can cheat, because this 0 makes
Alice’s error collapse to zero. However, the contribution of this additional factor can be neglected (it is only
O( 1Q ), compared to the O( 1√Q ) given by CHSHQ).
We assume for now that the propagation time of the information is 2 rounds. This means that when
Alice(i mod 2) receives xi, the other Alice will know the value of xi at round i + 2. Therefore, a cheating
strategy for Alice is described by a m-tuple of functions S = (s1, . . . , sm), where each si corresponds to
Alice’s output function at round i. s1 is a function of x1 and si is a function of (x0, . . . , xi−2, xi) for i ≥ 1
where we use the convention x0 = d. For each i ≥ 1, xi ∈ FQ and the output space of each si is FQ.
Consider any fixed cheating strategy S for Alice. At the end of the protocol, Bob checks that ym = αm−1.
When we expand αm−1 as a function of (d, x1, . . . , xm−1), the checking condition, that we call Cm becomes
ym = ym−1 − xm−1
(
ym−2 − xm−2
(
... ...− x2(y1 − d · x1)...
))
.
If this equality is not verified, Alice is caught cheating. On the other hand, if Cm is verified then Bob
cannot distinguish an honest Alice from a dishonest one, and he does not abort.
Let Cm(S, d, x1, . . . , xm−1) the event which corresponds to the above equality being verified. Alice’s
cheating probability using S, that we note gm(S) is therefore
gm(S) := Pr
d,x1,...,xm−1
[Cm(S, d, x1, . . . , xm−1)]
where d is a uniformly random bit and x1, . . . , xm−1 are uniformly random elements of FQ. We also define
gm := maxS gm(S) which is Alice’s maximal cheating probability in Pm. In this section, we present a
cheating strategy S for Alice such that
gm(S) =
1
2
+
1
2
(
1− (1− ω(CHSHQ))⌊
m−1
3
⌋
)
.
which will prove Theorem 2. In order to do so, we first modify protocol Pm to make it more symmetric
(Section 3.1). Then, we describe our attack (Section 3.2) and we prove its cheating probability (Section 3.3).
3.1 Symmetrization of the protocol
We want to describe a recursive strategy for protocol Pm. Unfortunately, this protocol induces a difference
between Alice’s strategy at round 1 ≤ k < m and her strategy at round m. Because of that, it is difficult to
study the protocol recursively.
We therefore consider a modified protocol P ′m, which, as we will show, is a bit easier than Pm to win,
but harder than Pm+1. In this modified version, at round m, Bobm mod 2 sends an additional random string
xm ∈ FQ, and Alicem mod 2 returns ym = xm · am−1 instead of ym = am−1. All other rounds are unchanged.
Similarly, as for Pm, a cheating strategy for Alice S′ can be described as a m-tuple of functions (s′1, . . . , s′m)
that give Alice’s outputs yi depending on her accessible information at round i.
Bob checks now that ym = xm ·αm−1 and therefore, the condition Alice must satisfied to win is modified
into C′m(S′, d, x1, . . . , xm), where
C′m(S′, d, x1, . . . , xm)⇔ ym = xm
(
ym−1 − xm−1
(
ym−2 − xm−2
(
... ...− x2(y1 − d · x1)...
)))
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By expanding C′m(S′, d, x1, . . . , xm), it can be written down as :
ym = xm · ym−1
− xm · xm−1 · ym−2
+ xm · xm−1 · xm−2 · ym−3
...
...
− (−1)mxm · xm−1 · xm−2 · ... · x1 · d
or, using a compact form:
C′m(S′, d, x1, . . . , xm)⇔ ym =
m−1∑
i=1

(−1)m−iyi · m∏
j=i+1
xi

− (−1)md · m∏
j=1
xj
For a cheating strategy S′, Alice’s winning probability g′m(S
′) for this modified protocol is therefore defined
as
g′m(S
′) := Pr
d,x1,...,xm
[C′m(S′, d, x1, . . . , xm)] and g′m := max
S′
g′m(S
′)
We show the following
Lemma 2. ∀m ≥ 2, we have gm ≤ g′m ≤ gm+1.
Proof.
• For the first inequality, let us consider the optimal strategy S = (s1, ..., sm) for Pm, where sk is Alice’s
strategy at round k (i.e. a function that outputs yk when given Alice’s knowledge at round k). Alice’s
cheating probability for Pm is gm(S). Consider the following strategy S′ := (s1, ..., sm−1, s′m) for
P ′m, where s′m(d, x1, . . . , xm−2, xm) := xm · sm(d, x1, . . . , xm−2). S′ allows to win on P ′m at least as
efficiently as S on Pm, because S′ wins whenever S does. Indeed, suppose that S is a winning strategy
for a given (d, x1, ..., xm−1). This means that Cm(S, d, x1, . . . , xm−1) is satisfied or equivalently:
sm(d, x1, . . . , xm−2) = ym−1 − xm−1
(
ym−2 − ... ...− x2(y1 − d · x1)...
)
Then, since s′m(d, x1, . . . , xm−2, xm) = xm · sm(d, x1, . . . , xm−2), we get
s′m(d, x1, . . . , xm−2, xm) = xm
(
ym−1 − xm−1
(
ym−2 − ... ...− x2(y1 − d · x1)...
))
which implies C′m(S′, d, x1, . . . , xm), for any xm. From there, we immediately get
gm = gm(S) ≤ g′m(S′) ≤ g′m.
• For the other inequality, we fix an optimal strategy S′ = (s1, ..., sm) for P ′m. We consider the following
strategy S := (s1, ..., sm, 0) for Pm+1, where 0 is the function that always outputs 0, no matter the
inputs. This means that when performing S, we always have ym+1 = 0. S is at least as good to win
Pm+1 as S′ is to win P ′m. Indeed, if for a tuple (d, x1, ..., xm), S′ wins on P ′m, then C′(S′, d, x1, . . . , xm)
holds or equivalently
ym = xm
(
ym−1 − xm−1
(
ym−2 − xm−2
(
... ...− x2(y1 − d · x1)...
)))
From there, we immediately have
ym+1 = 0 = ym − xm
(
ym−1 − xm−1
(
ym−2 − xm−2
(
... ...− x2(y1 − d · x1)...
)))
which implies Cm+1(S, d, x1, . . . , xm). From there, we immediately get
g′m = g
′
m(S
′) ≤ gm+1(S) ≤ gm+1.
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The above lemma shows in particular how to transform a strategy for P ′m into a strategy for Pm+1 with
at least as good cheating probability. This means that we can study P ′m instead of Pm+1. The first inequality
shows that we do not lose much doing so.
We also make another change. In order to simplify calculations, we ask Alice to answer at each round i
y˜i := (−1)i+1yi instead of yi. For the protocol, it is totally equivalent to use y˜i or yi but it allows to avoid all
(−1) factors. With this notation, Alice’s victory condition C′m(S′, d, x1, . . . , xm) for the protocol becomes:
m∑
i=1

y˜i m∏
j=i+1
xj

 = d m∏
j=1
xj
In the next section, we present a cheating strategy for protocol P ′m.
3.2 Description of the attack
In the previous section, we transformed protocol P into a slightly modified protocol P ′, which has extra
symmetries and for which it will be simpler to construct a recursive cheating strategy. In this section, we
describe this strategy for P ′.
More precisely, we define recursively a strategy with a step of three rounds. To initialize, we consider the
following strategy for P ′3:
• A1 always outputs y˜1 = 0.
• A1 and A2 perform the optimal strategy for the CHSHQ game with inputs x1 and x2. Let a and b be
their respective outputs.
• A2 outputs y˜2 = d · a for round 2 and A1 outputs y˜3 = x3 · d · b for round 3.
With this strategy, C′3 becomes x3 ·d · (a+ b−x1 ·x2) = 0. Alice wins if x3 = 0, if d = 0, or if a+ b = x1 ·x2.
These events are independent, which gives g′3 ≥ 1− 12 (1 − 1Q )(1− ω(CHSHQ)).
We now describe a strategy for k + 3 rounds using a strategy for k rounds. We fix a cheating strategy
S′k for Alice for P ′k and we present a cheating strategy S′k+3 for P ′k+3.
Recursive Description of a cheating strategy S′k+3 given S
′
k
• Rounds 1 to k: Alice performs the strategy S′k to get outputs y˜1, . . . , y˜k.
• Round k + 1: Alice always outputs y˜k+1 = 0.
• Rounds k + 2 and k + 3: From round k + 2, A1 and A2 both know d, x1, . . . , xk. Let
η := d
k∏
j=1
xj −
k∑
i=1
(y˜i
k∏
j=i+1
xj).
A(k+2) mod 2 and A(k+3) mod 2 perform the optimal strategy for CHSHQ on respective inputs xk+2
and xk+1 to get respective outputs a and b. Their outputs of the protocol are respectively y˜k+2 = η ·a
and y˜k+3 = η · b · xk+3. Notice that if η = 0, which will correspond to the strategy S′k succeeding to
achieve C′k, Alice outputs y˜k+2, y˜k+3 = 0 independently of a and b.
In the next section, we will prove the cheating probability achieved by this strategy, which will imply our
main theorem.
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3.3 Analysis
Lemma 3. ∀k ≥ 2, g′k satisfies :
1− g′k+3(S′k+3) ≤ (1−
1
Q
) (1− ω(CHSHQ)) (1− g′k(S′k)).
Proof. We consider P ′k+3. Alice’s winning condition C′k+3 is:
k+3∑
i=1

y˜i k+3∏
j=i+1
xj

 = d k+3∏
j=1
xj
or, by taking apart the last 3 terms :
y˜k+3
+ xk+3 · y˜k+2
+ xk+3 · xk+2 · y˜k+1
+ xk+3 · xk+2 · xk+1 ·
k∑
i=1
(
y˜i
k∏
j=i+1
xj
)
= xk+3 · xk+2 · xk+1 · d
k∏
j=1
xj
Recall that η := d
k∏
j=1
xj −
k∑
i=1
(y˜i
k∏
j=i+1
xj) ∈ Fq. Using η, we get :
C′k+3 ⇔ y˜k+3 + xk+3 · y˜k+2 + xk+3 · xk+2 · y˜k+1 = xk+3 · xk+2 · xk+1 · η
Recall from our protocol description that y˜k+2 = η · a and y˜k+3 = η · b · xk+3, where a and b are the Alice’s
outputs of the CHSHQ game. From there, we have
C′k+3 ⇔ y˜k+3 + xk+3 · y˜k+2 + xk+3 · xk+2 · y˜k+1 = xk+3 · xk+2 · xk+1 · η
⇔ xk+3 · b · η + xk+3 · a · η + 0 = xk+3 · xk+2 · xk+1 · η
⇔ η · xk+3 · (a+ b− xk+1 · xk+2) = 0
⇔ (xk+3 = 0) ∨ (η = 0) ∨ (a+ b = xk+1 · xk+2)
These 3 events are independent as :
• (xk+3 = 0) only depends on xk+3, and happens with probability 1Q .
• (η = 0) only depends on d, x1, ..., xk, and happens with probability g′k(S′k).
• (a + b = xk+1 · xk+2) only depends on xk+1 and xk+2 (A1 and A2 optimally play the CHSHQ game
on inputs xk+1, xk+2, ignoring any unnecessary information). This happens therefore with probability
ω(CHSHQ).
Thus, this particular strategy gives
g′k+3(S
′
k+3) = Pr[C′k+3] = 1− (1− g′k(S′k))(1 −
1
Q
)(1 − ω(CHSHQ))
or equivalently
1− g′k+3(S′k+3) ≤ (1−
1
Q
) (1− ω(CHSHQ)) (1− g′k(S′k)).
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We can now prove our main theorem
Theorem 2. ∀m ≥ 3, we have :
gm ≥ 1− 1
2
((
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ))
)⌊m−1
3
⌋
Proof. By iterating the above lemma, we obtain
1− g′3k(S′3k) ≤
((
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ))
)k−1
(1− g′3(S′3))
Combining this with the initialization step g′3(S3) ≥ 1− 12 (1− 1Q )(1 − ω(CHSHQ)) gives
g′3k ≥ g′3k(S3k) ≥ 1−
1
2
((
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ))
)k
.
Using the symmetrization lemma (Lemma 2), we immediately get
g3k+1 ≥ g′3k ≥ 1−
1
2
((
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ))
)k
.
If m can be written m = 3k + 1 for some k, we have
gm ≥ 1− 1
2
((
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ))
)m−1
3
Since gm is an increasing function, we have for all m ≥ 3:
gm ≥ 1− 1
2
((
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ))
)⌊m−1
3
⌋
4 Generalization
In the previous part, we assumed that A1 and A2 can communicate efficiently, very efficiently, meaning that
the propagation time ρ is 2 rounds. With such a propagation time, relativistic constraints ensure that at a
given round k, Alice cannot use any information concerning the round k−1. However, we supposed that she
knows everything about the rounds k− 2 and before. Note that she obviously has access to the information
of round k − 2, because it occurs at the same place than round k.
What happens if A1 and A2 cannot reliably share their knowledge so fast? In this case, the propagation
time ρ will be larger, and at any round k, Alice knows everything about rounds 1, 2, ..., k − ρ with . We
use an even propagation time without loss of generality since computations rotate between two places, and
Alice always knows what happened at rounds k − 2, k − 4, etc. In this situation, we will show that A1 and
A2 cannot just play the CHSHQ game. They will have to play the CHSHγQ game, for some γ that will be
specified later.
Another restriction that we do on the cheating players is thatA1 and A2 may need some time to determine
the bit d they want to decommit to. We call k0 the round starting from which both A1 and A2 know if they
try to reveal d = 0 or d = 1.
In this more practical setting, we propose the following recursive variant of our attack, for k > k0, for
any propagation time ρ ≥ 2.
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Recursive Description of a cheating strategy Sk+ρ+1 given Sk
• Rounds 1 to k: Alice performs the strategy Sk to get outputs y˜1, . . . , y˜k.
• Rounds k + 1 to k + ρ− 1: Alice outputs y˜k+1, . . . , y˜k+ρ−1 = 0.
• Rounds k + ρ and k + ρ+ 1: From round k + ρ, A1 and A2 both know d, x1, . . . , xk. Let
η := d
k∏
j=1
xj −
k∑
i=1
(y˜i
k∏
j=i+1
xj).
A1 also knows X =
∏
j odd : k+1≤j≤k+ρ xj and A2 knows Y =
∏
j even : k+1≤j≤k+ρ xj . A(k+ρ) mod 2
and A(k+ρ+1) mod 2 perform the optimal strategy for CHSHγQ with γ := 1 − (1 − 1Q )
ρ
2 on respective
inputs X and Y to get respective outputs a and b. Their outputs of the protocol are respectively
y˜k+ρ = η · a and y˜k+ρ+1 = η · b · xk+ρ+1.
Lemma 4. ∀k ≥ k0, we have
g′k+ρ+1 ≥
(
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ)) g′k + 1−
(
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ))
Proof. This demonstration will be similar to Lemma 3. We consider the cheating strategy described above.
Alice’s winning condition C′k+ρ+1 is:
k+ρ+1∑
i=1

y˜i k+ρ+1∏
j=i+1
xj

 = d k+ρ+1∏
j=1
xj
or, by separating the last ρ+ 1 terms :
y˜k+ρ+1
+ xk+ρ+1 · y˜k+ρ
+ 0
...
+ 0
+
(
k+ρ+1∏
j=k+1
xj
)
k∑
i=1
(
y˜i
k∏
j=i+1
xj
)
=
(
k+ρ+1∏
j=k+1
xj
)
d
k∏
j=1
xj
Recall that η := d
k∏
j=1
xj −
k∑
i=1
(y˜i
k∏
j=i+1
xj), which allows to simplify C′k+ρ+1 as follows
C′k+ρ+1 ⇔ y˜k+ρ+1 + xk+ρ+1 · y˜k+ρ =

k+ρ+1∏
j=k+1
xj

 · η
⇔ y˜k+ρ+1 + xk+ρ+1 · y˜k+ρ = X · Y · η.
In her cheating strategy, Alice answers y˜k+ρ = a · η and y˜k+ρ+1 = xk+ρ+1 · b · η, where a and b are the
Alices’ answers when playing the CHSHγQ game, on inputs X and Y . Thus
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C′k+ρ+1 ⇔ (xk+ρ+1 = 0) ∨ (η = 0) ∨ (a+ b = XY )
These three events are independent. The first one occurs with probability 1Q , the second one with
probability g′k. For the third one, notice that X is a product of
ρ
2 uniformly random number in FQ. Therefore,
we have Pr[X = 0] = 1−(1− 1Q )
ρ
2 = γ and for any z ∈ F∗Q, Pr[X = z] = 1−γQ−1 . Y satisfies the same probability
distribution. Therefore, Pr[a + b = XY ] is exactly the probability of winning the CHSHγQ game using its
optimal strategy.
This gives :
g′k+ρ+1 ≥ 1−
(
1− 1
Q
)
(1− g′k)
(
1− ω(CHSHγQ)
)
Then using Lemma 1 :
g′k+ρ+1 ≥ 1−
(
1− 1
Q
)
(1− g′k) (1− ω(CHSHQ))
i.e.
g′k+ρ+1 ≥
(
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ)) g′k + 1−
(
1− 1
Q
)
(1− ω(CHSHQ))
Theorem 3. For any k0 ≥ 1 and ρ ≥ 2, for any m ≥ k0 + ρ+ 1, we have
gm ≥ 1− 1
2
(
(1− 1
Q
) (1− ω(CHSHQ))
)m−k0−1
ρ+1
Proof. We use the recursive inequality from Lemma 4, and the trivial initialization g′k0 ≥ 12 . This gives us∀k ≥ k0, we have
g′k0+k(ρ+1) ≥ 1−
1
2
(
(1− 1
Q
) (1− ω(CHSHQ))
)k
,
and by using Lemma 2
gk0+k(ρ+1)+1 ≥ 1−
1
2
(
(1− 1
Q
) (1− ω(CHSHQ))
)k
.
If m can be written m = k0 + k(ρ+ 1) + 1, we have k =
m−k0−1
ρ+1 and
gm ≥ 1− 1
2
(
(1− 1
Q
) (1− ω(CHSHQ))
)m−k0−1
ρ+1
.
In order, to conclude, notice that gm is an increasing function in m. We can therefore conclude that
gm ≥ 1− 1
2
(
(1− 1
Q
) (1− ω(CHSHQ))
)⌊m−k0−1
ρ+1
⌋
.
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